By Damian J. Terrill & Markos Trichas, BAE Systems UK
Abstract
There is a growing concern that deepening instability within the contemporary geopolitical domain will influence the collaborative nature of international research and constrain its validity. Such limitations are not only disadvantageous to capability development, but are likely to have a significant impact upon the spirit of wider international relations whilst presenting clear opportunities for exploitation by those governments who seek to destabilise the Rules-based International Order (R-bIO).
In response, this paper examines the implications of contemporary Insider Threat (IT) and emphasises the vulnerability of the space industry to hostile covert influence. The authors define the key concepts associated with insider threat and then highlight the evolving trends in the field. An analysis of those aspects of the space industry that are especially vulnerable to IT is presented, with the term ‘Networked Insider Threat’ introduced to account for those circumstances in which a hostile actor intentionally exploits privileged credentials or access to disrupt, degrade, or deny a third party’s legitimate business. Finally, a systematic psycho-social model of IT mitigation that aligns the principle of Dual Allegiance (DA) with the Capability Opportunity Motivation-Behaviour (COM-B) paradigm and an established agent recruitment modality (FIREPLACES) is presented as a credible means of limiting IT within the space industry.